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Images of Europeans:  In-Group Trust and Support for European Integration 
By Gaspare M. Genna* 
Abstract	
Prior research on citizen support for European integration does not consider how 
individuals’ evaluations of European nationalities are associated with support. This paper 
fills this gap by developing a political cohesion model based on social identity theory. I 
claim that the probability of supporting integration increases with greater levels of trust in 
fellow Europeans, which assumes to reflect their positive images. Also, trust in eastern 
European Union nationalities has the highest impact on the probability for support, 
followed by trust in the southern nationalities, and then northern nationalities due to the 
eastern and southern nationalities relatively lower economic development. Controlling for 
various factors, the ordered logistic regression analysis of the European Election Study 
(2004) data support these claims. 
Introduction  
The ideas and practice of European unification is an example of political community 
building. Jean Monnet and others in the pan-European movement held a vision that is reflected in 
the preamble to the Treaty of Rome:  integration is a project establishing a polity with a common 
political structure. My central argument is that support for integration is associated with the 
formation of a European political community. The foundation of this community is the 
development of positive images among fellow Europeans because such images broaden in-group 
membership. However images of individuals with a northerner, southerner, or eastern European 
identity will have varying effects on support for European unification. Early thoughts regarding 
European integration promoted an idealism of uniting a people by establishing a community of 
Europeans. However, this goal is also pragmatic because it can facilitate positive-sum 
transactions.  
The current sovereign debt and financial crises have placed strains on the evolving trans-
European community. Various EU nationalities question the wisdom of economically assisting 
struggling economies on the one hand, and those nationalities who receive economic assistance 
have voiced significant opposition over the conditions of the assistance on the other hand. 
Adding to this tension is a clear geographic, cultural, economic difference among those giving 
assistance and those receiving it. It therefore becomes important to explain how the images 
individuals have of their fellow Europeans impacts their support for the mechanism (i.e. 
integration) that brings them together. Having a political community promotes a significant 
degree of support for components of the political system, such as institutions and politicians 
(Easton 1965: 189). Deutsch refers to a political community as a “people who have learned to 
communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of 
                                                     
* Gaspare M. Genna is an associate professor of political science at The University of Texas at El Paso 
and associate editor of Politics & Policy. His publications focus on the structural conditions that promote 
regional integration around the world. Publications can be accessed at: 
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goods and service” (1953: 61). A political community, therefore, is a cohesive set of individuals 
who have developed a social-psychological attachment with one another through greater 
communication and understanding. What has often been referred to as a “we feeling” (Deutsch et 
al 1957: 36) has also been captured in other, more general, renditions of community (Taylor 
1972; Harrison 1974). Interpersonal trust is a foundation of community because it facilitates 
collaboration within a common structure.  
This paper empirically supports the theoretical connection between the level of trans-
European political cohesion and support for integration. The proposed model will detail the 
association between varying trust for individuals form various parts of European 
(north/south/east) and public support for integration. The remaining sections will detail the 
importance of in-group membership for an individual’s motivation to support integration. I test 
the hypotheses using ordered logistic regression analysis using data from the European Election 
Study (2004) data that includes a representative sample from individuals in 24 EU members-
states.i  
Self-interest, trust, and cooperation 
Easton’s (1965; 1975) theoretical work views public support as being either specific (also 
known as utilitarian support) or diffuse. Individuals provide utilitarian support when the state 
provides acceptable outputs (which can be economic or non-economic gains for the individual); 
in so doing, the state maintains the system through citizen support (Easton 1965: 157). The 
research regarding utilitarian support of European integration builds on the conceptualization of 
self-interest, which has long been the cornerstone of understanding political decisions (Olson 
1965).ii Researchers point out that motivations for utilitarian support arise from evaluations of 
the European Union’s ability to provide benefits and minimize any negative effects, including 
the changing role of EU institutions as integration evolves (Anderson and Reichert 1996). Feld 
and Wildgen’s (1976) work shows a connection between support levels in the four core countries 
of the European Economic Community (EEC) to that of welfare increases in the early years of 
integration. The attempt at explaining support continued with Handley (1981) who descriptively 
notes that the economic downturns of the 1970s dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. 
Eichenberg and Dalton’s (1993) refined the testing of this argument by looking at the various 
material influences on support levels with similar results. Others have also built upon this 
method of analysis with analogous findings (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Duch and Taylor 
1997). Moreover, others have taken a more direct approach and predicted the probability of their 
support given the individual’s socio-economic position in the economy and the expected effects 
of market integration (Anderson 1991; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; 
Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998). 
Other individual motivations, while being self-interest in nature, are not necessary 
economic. The founders of European integration were driven by the memories of catastrophic 
wars and hoped that regional integration would be a vehicle for a permanent peace (Deutsch et al 
1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 1966). Europeans also supported integration, in its early 
years, in part for its promise to prevent war (Hewstone 1986). However, with the passing 
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memory of war and the end of the Cold War, physical security is not as strong a factor in 
supporting integration as it once was (Gabel 1998). Other benefits include a more effective form 
of governance that is lacking at the national level due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and 
high levels of corruption (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).  
These studies provide insights into utilitarian support levels, but answer only a narrow 
range of questions and provide, at best, short-term explanations. Business cycles and other 
factors that influence self-interest motivations help to explain utilitarian support, but these 
variables do not explain how psychological factors, such as in-group/out-group dynamics, would 
also influence support. Such dynamics would explain how Europeans’ views on fellow 
nationalities in the EU relate to utilitarian support and can serve as a more stable explanation 
because it relies on deep-seated perceptions.  
Diffuse support is a “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to 
accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging 
to their wants” (Easton 1965: 273; 1975: 444). Easton goes on to say that such support “is an 
attachment to a political object for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As 
such, it taps deep political sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointment with 
outputs” (Easton 1965: 274). What “an attachment” refers to is not quite clear. Easton does 
mention that it is associated to a “sense of community” (1965: 325) but this concept also lacks 
specificity by leaving its definition as “the degree of solidarity” (1965: 184). In the simplest 
formulation, diffuse support occurs after a period of time when specific support is present 
(Easton 1965).iii Diffuse support enters the picture when the political system has a “communal 
ideology” that promotes a common interest (Easton 1965: 333). However, common interest is 
not entirely separate from self-interest. It is possible for a collection of individuals to have 
similar interests; however the summation of these interests does not necessarily define a common 
interest. Common interests arise from a coordination of similar self-interests and lead to 
collaboration. This collaboration is more likely at higher rates of political cohesion, as measured 
by trust in others. Common interest develops because there is a “sense of community” where 
individuals strongly identify with one another (Easton 1965: 326).  
Developing explanations for supporting integration by understanding the role of common 
interests are not new. One of the more cited sets of work in this area is the postmaterialist 
argument. Inglehart (1971; 1977a; 1977b) states that Europeans were socialized in an 
environment of high rates of economic growth. As a result individuals in the post-war era 
developed a different set of values (different from prior generations) that are amiable toward the 
prospects of regional integration. These individuals personally identify with supranational 
institutions and thereby give the process their support. However, Janssen (1991) and Gabel 
(1998) dispute this claim with empirical evidence. Their research finds little evidence for the 
relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration. In fact, the little evidence that 
does exist indicates that postmaterialists are less likely to support integration. However, the 
problem is not in the value of the postmaterialist explanation, but in how it was trying to explain 
public support for integration. Postmaterialism cannot tell us how postmaterialists or materialists 
reach their opinions (Rochon 1998). In fact, it may be possible for both value sets to favor 
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regional integration but for different reasons. Materialists could be in favor if they believe that 
regional integration will provide material and physical security. One can assume that 
postmaterialists would be in favor if they believe that it is a means to solve trans-national 
problems (e.g. clean air, water, etc.).  
A political cohesion model for EU support 
Research that looks at common interest motivations for individual support for integration 
has mainly focused on the factors that would impede the formation of the political community. 
They echo the claim by Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule because it adds 
legitimacy to those that govern by the governed. McLaren (2002) demonstrates that hostility 
towards other cultures effects attitudes towards the European Union. Carey (2002) also 
demonstrates that a strong national attachment lowers the probability that an individual will 
support regional integration. In addition, Van Kersbergen (2000) explains support for the EU by 
examining the role integration has in forming primary national allegiances. These researchers 
demonstrate that these types of attitudes pose a problem in developing a European identity and 
thereby lower the chances of supporting the EU. In developing a political cohesion model of 
public support, I focus attention on individuals’ direct evaluations of members of the trans-
European society. Support for integration can be partially explained by individuals’ perceptions 
that integration is a group effort and as such is susceptible collective action problems. Support 
improves with higher levels of cohesion because transnational social cohesion lowers the barriers 
to collective action that are needed to solve problems facing Europeans.  
Political cohesion is closely associated with establishment of a common identity. Through 
a common identity, individuals can rationalize that individual problems are actually collective 
problems and that societies need to forge links, by way of integration, if they are to be solved. A 
common European identity is not necessarily associated with a foundational mythos, ethnic 
affiliation (Obradovic 1996), common language, or shared customs (Smith 1992), or any 
characteristic that we usually associate with national identities (Zetterholm 1994; Cederman 
1996; McKay 1996). However, it does have a similarity with national identities in that it is 
“imagined” and develops through the construction of a society (Anderson 1991). This notion of 
“imagined” speaks to the malleable nature of identity and is therefore a construction or 
adaptation to new political and/or economic realities rather than from biological or common 
blood rationalities. In its construction, individuals make choices as to who can and cannot belong 
to a specific identity. In fact, individuals may also choose to belong or not to belong given the 
characteristics of those who already claim the identity. I will demonstrate that in-group/out-
group identity (who is and is not a member of group) is important in the social-psychological 
dynamics within and among such groups in a political community.  
The construction of a European identity has been associated with a common belief in 
liberal-democratic values (Moravcsik 1993; Beetham and Lord 1998), which have been codified 
in the legal formation of European citizenship. However, the average EU citizen may not have 
this level of sophisticated understanding of identity given that they are not well informed 
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(Anderson 1998). The more reasonable approach in explaining support for integration is through 
the psychology of common interest evaluations.  
Piaget (1965) stated that building attachments to groups is part of normal human behavior. 
These attachments promote cohesion among group members and are associated with the social-
psychological phenomena of in-group bias and subjective images. Individuals become members 
of the in-group because the group fulfills some need (Terhune 1964; Winter 1973; Stogdill 1974; 
McClelland 1975; Bass 1981). At the level of national identity, individuals form attachment 
because they see the nation as the embodiment of what is important (DeLamater et al. 1969). 
Also individuals will interact with individuals who are members of another group if the other 
group’s members share some commonality with in-group members (Brewer 1968). The members 
of both groups are more trusting of each other and thereby facilitating cooperation among 
members. One often cited definition of trust is “the probability of getting preferred outcomes 
without the group doing anything to bring them about” (Gamson 1968:54). That is, group 
members will not need to monitor each other because there is confidence that interests are 
aligned. In other words, one will not take advantage of the other because everyone has the 
interest to effectively cooperate. Putnam (1993) shows, in the Italian cases, that the level of trust 
one has for others produces effective institutional performance because of the higher probability 
of obtaining cooperation. It lowers the costs of association because of the perception that 
individuals will not cheat or defect. In paraphrasing Wintrobe (1995:  46), trust yields a stream of 
future returns on exchanges that would not otherwise take place because trust makes behavior 
predictable and stable. Therefore, individuals may develop overlapping group memberships or an 
integrated identity when trust is present. When trust is not present, overlapping memberships do 
not occur and group status becomes exclusive.  
How is political cohesion, as measured by trust levels, associated with support for European 
unification? Why would the heterogeneity along a north-south-east dimension partially explain the 
variation of these two types of support? Social identity theory provides a good framework in 
getting answers to these questions, namely the two phenomena of in-group bias and out-group bias. 
In-group bias is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of their in-group 
versus others who are not members (the out-group members) (Tajfel 1978). In early psychological 
experiments individuals tended to give more rewards and side with other members of their group 
because of their affiliation. These biases occurred even when test subjects were only recently 
informed that they belong to a particular group and had never met nor interacted with other in-
group members (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1978; Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Brewer and Kramer 1985; 
Messick and Mackie 1989).  
The cause of this bias, as put forth by Tajfel (1981; 1982), is due to positive evaluations 
individuals have for members of their group. They join and are identified by such groups because, 
as stated above, the group symbolizes a set of values. By associating with similar-valued 
individuals, self-esteem improves because values are reinforced. This self-esteem further improves 
when individuals make favorable comparisons between the in-group and out-group. Not only are 
they part of a subjectively valued group, the in-group is also subjectively judged as better than the 
other out-groups. Therefore, by tying an individual’s social identity to the importance of the in-
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group, group maintenance or cooperation for group survival becomes important. To this end, 
individuals will tend to give favorable biases to fellow group members.  
Out-group bias, however, is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of 
out-groups instead of members of their own in-group. Out-group bias occurs when the two groups 
under observation are self-determined to be of differing social status (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and 
Turner 1986). Individuals from the lower status group have negative evaluations of members of 
their group when compared to the higher status out-group. The negative evaluations stem simply 
from their lower status position and are tied to their self-esteem. The relative evaluations lead 
members of the lower status group to have positive evaluations of higher status members and 
thereby extend favoritism to them. This phenomenon occurs when the lower status group feels that 
the higher status group is legitimately in their position and that the status hierarchy is stable 
(neither group will change their status) (Turner 1978). However, the members of the higher status 
group will continue to exhibit in-group biases because they have positive evaluations of their 
members and negative evaluations of the members from the out-group. Again this stems simply 
from the differing social status of the groups (Turner 1978).  
Since cohesiveness is a function of in-group evaluations associated with identity, it is 
important to revisit the possible phenomenon of overlapping in-groups. This is important in the 
context of integration because the formation of a European identity is not theorized to replace 
national identities but to coexist with them (Deutsch et al. 1957). This is where the concept of 
image becomes important. Kelman (1965:  24) states that image:  
…refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive system. 
The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it refers – the 
individual’s conception of what this object is like. Image is an inferred construct, 
however, rather than a mere designation of the way the object is phenomenally 
experienced.  
Scott, more succinctly, defines “…an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the 
totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation” 
(1965:  72). In addition, such images are subjective (Kelman 1965:  27). Individuals can use 
images of other groups to formulate likes and dislikes for and positive or negative stereotypes of 
out-groups (Druckman et al. 1974; Hewstone 1986; Druckman 1994). A positive image therefore 
develops the likelihood that multiple identities form as members of in-groups view the values of 
out-group members as similar and therefore compatible. Groups can, by this mechanism, tie 
themselves together in a unifying identity, in one extreme, much like individuals do with one 
another in forming group attachments. Recall that individuals tend to form groups, in part, because 
of emotional importance to the group’s symbolic values. If a subset of such values is present in 
other groups, then a broader identity will form without necessarily dissolving prior identities. The 
individuals in the broader group (one that includes two or more in-groups) can now operate with 
similar cohesiveness as the individual in-groups. However if such values are not present then the 
in-group and out-group biases will manifest leading to a lack of cohesiveness.  
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In the context of Europe, individuals support integration when they have a positive image of 
other EU nationalities. This positive image may result from evaluations of similarity on a number 
of issues and thus an individual will tend to view other nationalities as more in line with the in-
group versus an exclusive out-group identity. While Europeans may see some difference in tastes, 
such as food, music, art, etc., such differences would only limit the possibility of replacing the 
national identities with a European one. Where there are similarities, a cohesive political 
community can develop. Subjectively perceived dissimilar values would produce less trust and 
lowers the probability of supporting integration.  
Since the 2004 EU expansion, individuals can subjectively perceive differences along a 
north-south-east divide. Delhey (2007) demonstrates that underlying the geographic divide are 
stark differences in economic development and cultural characteristics. Images of southern 
nationalities as lesser developed economically due to holding dissimilar values are prevalent in the 
minds of some. The eastern countries’ economic development is also low and also coupled with 
views regarding the legacies of communist rule and less experience with democracy. The resulting 
image of a more economically developed north can point to significant differences among the 
peoples of Europe. The issue of development is an important aspect because the level of economic 
development is perceived as an outcome of commonalities specific to the northern, southern, and 
eastern sub-regions. The cultural factor that influences social-psychological perceptions may well 
have its roots in the Protestant reformation. This, along with the 30 Years War and the resulting 
Treaty of Westphalia, established national cultures along a Catholic-Protestant divide.iv The 
eastern expansion also introduced a wave of entries that had unique cultural features not only due 
to religion, but also perceived cultural differences associated with their communist eras.  
While the religious roots of development can be debated and refuted, the idea of a cultural 
explanation for development may linger in the mind of the average European. Niedermayer (1995) 
has already observed that there is a variation in trust among the first twelve EU nationalities. On 
average, northern nationalities were given more trust than southerners. But what is not clear from 
his research is the distribution of trust level across northern and southern respondents. Also, this 
research does not link trust levels to support, but does make a case for looking at trust in 
community building. Delhey (2007) demonstrated that trust among EU nationalities does vary 
along geographic divides and that this variation of trust does have implications to the social 
cohesion of Europe. I propose to take the empirical work a step further by linking variation in trust 
among the EU nationalities to general support for integration.  
Using the logic of social identity theory in the context of EU, I propose to test the following 
hypotheses. First, there is a positive association between the overall level of trust for fellow EU 
nationalities and support for integration. This trust is assumed to reflect the positive image of the 
European nationalities in the mind of the respondent. Positive images reflect group overlaps and 
the associated biases. Second, there would be a larger impact of trust in eastern nationalities, 
followed by trust in southern nationalities. It is hypothesized that trust in northern nationalities will 
have a positive impact on support for integration, but not as large as trust in easterners and 
southerners. Given the lower economic development of the eastern and southern nationalities, they 
would comprise the lower status groups. This lower status would promote biases against them and 
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wishing to exclude them from the broader European in-group. Therefore to support integration, 
individuals will need to trust them before they enter into a collaborative relationship.  
 
Data description and testing procedures 
The public opinion data come from European Election Study (2004).v As with most studies 
using secondary data, great efforts were taken to optimize the operationalization of the variables 
by following the suggestions made by Kiecolt and Nathan (1985). I use a weighted variable so 
that no national population will be over or under represented in the data because all tests are at 
the individual level.vi This variable also adjusts for any over or under representation of socio-
economic groups.  
OLS regression techniques are not permissible because the dependent variable is ordinal. 
Applying OLS techniques will produce inefficient coefficients that may lead to type one and two 
errors. The appropriate technique is to employ ordered regression models, specifically, an 
ordered logit model (Long 1997). Each model will be evaluated based upon its significance of 
explanation. The evaluations of the coefficients will be solely based on their statistical 
significance and direction of signs. The independent variables will then be judged based upon 
their contribution to predicting the probabilities of the dependent variable’s values.  
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is support for European integration. The survey question asks:  
Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone 
too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this 
scale, 1 means unification 'has already gone too far' and 10 means it 'should be pushed 
further'. What number on this scale best describes your position? 
Higher values indicate a greater support for the progress towards unification. One can interpret 
the lower values (<5) as less support, the mid-range (≈5) a satisfaction with the status quo, and 
higher values as support for increasing integration.  
 Independent variables 
The following are the explanatory variables, each of which measures the respondents’ trust 
in fellow EU nationalities. The operationalization of the trust variable is through a series of 
questions asking the respondents to gauge their trust in other EU nationalities:  
Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from 
various countries. Can you please tell me for each, whether you have a lot of trust of 
them or not very much trust.  
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The respondents go through and assign a level of trust to each EU nationality. The values were recoded so 
that 1=“have a lot of trust of them” and 0=“not very much trust.” A confirmatory factor analysis will 
demonstrate if the individual trust variables do in fact group along a north-south-east division.   
Control variablesvii 
The analysis requires the use of control variables so that the results are understood in the 
light of some prevailing hypotheses. 
Institutional Trust. Political trust is closely related to regime legitimacy (Zmerli and Hooge 
2011) and can be operationalized as trust in governmental institutions (Marien 2011). I therefore 
control for trust in two EU institutions that would be on the minds of the average EU citizen: the 
European Parliament and European Commission. The survey measures trust in these two 
institutions by using the following question: 
Please tell me on a score of 1-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I 
read out. 1 means that you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have 
complete trust.  
One other political institution that the responds are asked to evaluate is their home government. 
Support for integration can be negatively associated with trust in the respondent’s government 
(Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). If respondents strongly trust their home governments, supporting 
European integration can be a risky trade-off.  
Democratic Satisfaction. The democratic deficit is a widely talked about problem in EU 
politics (McCormick 1999; Schmitter 2000). Like trust in one’s home government, satisfaction 
with democracy in the respondents’ is negatively associated with support for integration 
(Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). The following question captures the degree to which individuals are 
satisfied with democracy in their country: 
On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [c.]? 
1.   Very satisfied  2.  Fairly satisfied 
3.  Not very satisfied 4.  Not at all satisfied. 
The values were recoded so that higher values indicate higher levels of satisfaction.  
Ideology. Prior research demonstrates the negative association nationalism has on both 
identity formation and support (McLaren 2002; Carey 2003). One method to measure this 
possible effect is through left-right self-evaluations.viii The respondents were asked to place 
themselves on a left-right continuum. The range is one to ten with ten being the most extreme 
rightist ideology. I hypothesize that the higher values of this variable will be negatively 
associated with support for integration for reasons given in McLaren (2002) and Carey (2003).  
Education. To measure this variable, I use a standard question which attempts to 
standardize educational achievement across Europe:  How old were you when you stopped full-
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time education? Individuals who are still studying are recoded into their appropriate age group 
based on their response to the question requesting their age. Although they have not completed 
their studies, this method captures the height of their educational status at the time survey.  
Income. Respondents were asked to provide the “total wages and salaries per month of all 
members of this household; all pensions and social insurance benefits; child allowances and any 
other income like rents etc.” The survey researchers categorized the responses into “quintiles of 
income” No specific hypothesis is developed here with regard to this variable’s contribution to 
explaining support for integration. 
Age. Respondents were asked to list the year of their birth. I subtracted the response from 
2004 in order to achieve the age at the time of the survey.  
Geographic Effects. Geographic dummies are included in each of the models. These 
dummy variables control for effects that are specific to the countries’ region: north, south, or 
east. I omit the dummy variable representing the east in each regression.  
Explaining support for the EU 
The overall results of the analysis show that political cohesion is an important factor in 
explaining support for the EU. The first step is to determine if the trust variables measured the 
latent dimensions described in the theoretical section. I hypothesized that trust in the EU 
nationalities measures political cohesiveness. This trust is thought to be divided along a north-
south-east dimension. Table one displays the results of the principle component factor analysis 
(varimax rotation). The analysis produced three factors, as hypothesized. Trust in the eastern 
nationalities loaded into the first factor, followed by trust in the northern nationalities, and then 
trust in the eastern nationalities. The weakest factor loading number among the trust in the 
northern nationalities variables is “trust in British” (0.375) but value is higher than the 0.300 
threshold for inclusion and will therefore not be omitted from the scale (DeVellis 1991; Acock 
2013). “Trust in the French” is strongly loaded into the southern nationalities factor. This 
indicates that the latent trust factor is religious/cultural in nature. I calculated three new variables 
(trust in northern, southern, and eastern nationalities) based on the factor loadings. The reliability 
alphas for the three scales range from 0.807 to 0.915 indicating very good reliability for the 
latent variable (DeVellis 1991). 
In order to assess the scales’ validities, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis using the 
maximum likelihood method. The analysis assumes that trust in northern, southern, and eastern 
nationalities accounts for how individuals responded the specific trust in nationalities questions. 
The results will confirm that one latent variable, along with the components’ error variance, will 
explain the covariance of the individual components (Acock 2013). Table two displays the 
confirmatory factor analysis goodness of fit results. The three regional trust scales have a χ2 that 
is highly significant (p=0.000). The comparative fit index (CFI) for each factor is above 0.900 
indicating a very strong fit with the data. For example, the trust in southern nationalities scale 
does 97.6% better than the null hypothesis that assumes the individual items are all unrelated to 
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each other. The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) is quite good for the trust in 
southern nationalities, but less than ideal for the other two scales. The RMSEA adjusts for the 
number of items included scale because more items, by chance, can produce a better fit. Ideally, 
the value should be less than 0.08 (Acock 2013). The standardized root mean squared residual 
(SRMR) examines how close the models are in reproducing the average correlations. The values 
for each scale are below the recommended values of 0.08 (Acock 2013). Overall, the 
confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the individual trust variables do measure the theorized 
three latent variables.   
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Table 1. Principle component factor analysis for trust in EU nationalities (varimax rotation) 
 
Trust in: Factor loading Factor loading Factor loading 
 
Lithuanians 0.811 0.248 0.043
Latvians 0.799 0.294 0.036
Slovakians 0.785 0.115 0.198
Slovenians 0.778 0.172 0.186
Estonians 0.776 0.311 0.046
Czechs 0.705 0.146 0.223
Hungarians 0.665 0.274 0.213
Cypriots 0.633 0.191 0.306
Poles 0.601 0.059 0.238
Maltese 0.590 0.367 0.260
 
Danes 0.248 0.801 0.134
Finns 0.325 0.753 0.108
Swedes 0.222 0.767 0.184
Dutch 0.176 0.745 0.234
Luxembourgers 0.237 0.691 0.278
Belgians 0.223 0.673 0.285
Irish 0.318 0.624 0.218
Austrians 0.243 0.598 0.207
Germans 0.094 0.533 0.430
British 0.191 0.375 0.299
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Italians 0.228 0.214 0.718
French 0.080 0.375 0.637
Spaniards 0.201 0.338 0.623
Portuguese 0.315 0.369 0.557
Greeks 0.430 0.269 0.511
χ2 (276)= 1.2 x 105; p < .000 
Trust in northern nationalities reliability  α = 0.889 
Trust in southern nationalities reliability  α = 0.807 
Trust in eastern nationalities reliability     α = 0.915 
Note: European Election Study 2004 
 
Table 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Goodness of Fit Results 
 
Trust Scale χ2 df RMSEA CFI SRMR ρ reliability 
Trust in Northern Nationalities 6301.4*** 44 0.129 0.900 0.067 0.875 
Trust in Southern Nationalities   659.6***   9 0.092 0.976 0.037 0.744 
Trust in Eastern Nationalities 6846.1*** 35 0.151 0.904 0.060 0.908 
Notes: ***p ≤ .001; N=8,539; European Election Study 2004  
 
 
Table 3. Ordered logit model:  Support for European unification on trust for Europeans 
 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 
Trust variables Coefficient S. E. Coefficient  S. E. 
Trust in all EU nationalities 0.306*** 0.025 --  
Trust in northern nationalities -- -- 0.076*** 0.025 
Trust in southern nationalities -- -- 0.158*** 0.023 
Trust in eastern nationalities -- -- 0.265*** 0.023 
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Control variables     
Trust in the European Parliament 0.105*** 0.015 0.106*** 0.015 
Trust in respondents’ government -0.037*** 0.010 -0.037*** 0.010 
Trust in the European Commission 0.168*** 0.015 0.167*** 0.015 
Satisfaction with democracy in 
respondents’ country 
0.182*** 0.032 0.176*** 0.032 
Left/Right self-placement -0.036*** 0.009 -0.030*** 0.010 
Northern country dummy -0.695*** 0.082 -0.589*** 0.084 
Southern country dummy -0.295*** 0.077 -0.221** 0.078 
     
Demographic variables     
Education 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 
Income 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.009 
Age 0.003* 0.001 0.003* 0.001 
     
τ1 -1.05 0.140 -0.979 0.141 
τ2 -0.592 0.139 -0.517 0.140 
τ3 -0.065 0.138 0.009 0.139 
τ4 0.335 0.138 0.411 0.139 
τ5 1.35 0.130 1.434 0.140 
τ6 1.78 0.140 1.868 0.140 
τ7 2.35 0.141 2.434 0.141 
τ8 3.04 0.142 3.130 0.143 
τ9 3.34 0.144 3.426 0.144 
χ2 (degrees of freedom) 1068.65 (11)***  1098.98(13)***  
17 
 
log likelihood -13533.9  -13565.9  
N 6,431  6,454  
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses;  
***p ≤ .001; **p ≤ .010; *p ≤ .050; European Election Study 2004 
 
Table three presents the first results of the ordered logit regression. Model one tests the 
relationship between trust for all EU nationalities and support. The trust for all EU nationalities 
variable is a simple mean of the individual trust components. The sign of the coefficient is 
positive and significant, indicating that the more an individual trusts members of other EU 
nationalities, the higher levels of support. This result holds even while controlling for the other 
variables. Figure one illustrates the marginal percentage change for each value of support for 
European integration. While holding the control values at their means, support for integration 
increases steadily has the trust for all EU nationalities goes from its minimum to its maximum 
value. If we aggregate the dependent variables’ response values of six or greater together, 
respondents are about 24.5 percentage points more likely to support integration as we move from 
the lowest to the highest level of trust in fellow EU nationalities. 
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The second model in table two substitutes the trust in all EU nationalities variable with 
those that measure trust in the northern, southern, and eastern nationalities. The results fall along 
expected lines. All three variables are positive and have high levels of statistical significance. 
The coefficient for the trust in eastern nationalities variable is the largest, followed by the 
southern variable. Trust in northern nationalities has the smallest coefficient. Figure two plots the 
marginal percentage point change as the various regional trust variables increase from their 
minimum to their maximum values. The largest percentage point change in support for European 
integration is with the trust in eastern nationalities variable, followed by trust in southerners, and 
then northerners. As the trust in eastern nationalities variable goes from its minimum to its 
maximum value, support for integration increases by 27.2 percentage points. The increase for 
trust in southerners is 24.6, while the increase for trust in northerners is only 10.2. 
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Figure three plots the probabilities at varying levels of the nationalities trust variables. Each 
bar represents a different combination of trust levels for each category of nationalities trust. The 
first bar (blue) is the predicted probability for each level of support when trust in northerners, 
southerners, and easterners are at their highest levels. The likelihood that an individual will have 
the highest level of support (a value of 10) is 32.2% and a mid-level support (a value of 5) is 
13.0%. When the level of trust in northerners is at its highest value and trust for easterners and 
southerners are their lowest values (red bar), mid-level support is at 24.0% and high level of 
support is at 5.0%. A high level of southern trust and low levels of trust in northerners and 
easterners (green bar) predicts a 24.9% likelihood at the mid-level and 8.8% at the highest level. 
The highest values of eastern trust and low levels of trust in northerners and southerners 
produces likelihoods of 24.4% and 10.2%, respectively. Therefore, the greatest differentiation 
among the three nationalities trust variables is in the higher end of the support values.  
The impact of each trust scale is further illustrated in figure four. I aggregated the upper 
range of the support variable (values 6-10) and re-estimated the predicted probabilities for 
varying levels of trust. When trust in northerners, southerners, and easterners are at their highest 
level, there is a 77.7% chance that an individual will support furthering integration. When trust in 
northern nationalities is high, and trust in southerners and easterners are low, there is a 27.7% 
chance that an individual will support furthering integration. When southern trust is high, but 
northern and eastern trust is low, there is a 41.5% chance of supporting the furthering of 
integration. Finally, when trust in easterners is high, but trust in northerners and southerners is 
low, there is a 45.3% chance of support for furthering integration.  In total, the results indicate 
the greater importance of trusting eastern nationalities when predicting the probabilities of 
individual support for European integration.   
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Conclusion 
The political cohesion model can be an aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting 
European integration. Greater levels of trust among individuals are significantly associated with 
higher probabilities of supporting integration. Given the lower level of economic development 
and differing cultures among the southern and eastern countries, individuals that trust these 
nationalities are more likely to see the common interests involved in building a united Europe. In 
short, the north-south-east demarcation is significant for Europeans when supporting integration.  
Two important items must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these items 
would necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important enough to 
consider. First, given that the survey used in this analysis is old, we would need to obtain up-to-
date data that indicates that the association between trust among Europeans and support has not 
changed. However, there is nothing in the model’s logic that makes the arguments any less 
salient today.  
Second, the survey was taken at the time Europe has expanded further eastward. This fact 
may not necessarily add complexity to model. The findings of the trust variables may be an 
artifact of the current expansion and less to do with economic development or cultural 
differences. This may be the case, but a look at the trust in southern nationalities variable puts 
this in doubt. The southern trust scale included two of the original members of the EU. If time of 
entry were to be the underlying factor, then we should see trust in the French and Italians load 
together along with the older members. Also, trust in the British factored into the northern 
grouping, even though it joined later. These points leads to the conclusion that heterogeneous 
economic development and culture are the key factors in understanding why trust in eastern 
nationalities is more important.  
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Endnotes: 
                                                     
i Individuals from Malta were not included in this survey. Bulgarian and Romanian respondents were also 
not included because these countries where not yet EU members. 
iiThe utilitarian support approach also stems from the endogenous political economy literature, which 
approaches the study of integration through a rational framework. It is closely related to other works that 
explain the behavior of domestic forces by looking at group motivations and their impact on national 
government decision (Downs 1957; Gamson 1961; Ames 1987; Levi 1988; Geddes 1994; Haggard and 
Kaufman 1995). The primary motivation of the political elite is either to remain in power or to allow a 
particular political party to remain in power. Therefore the politician will form coalitions among societal 
groups for this end. The wishes of the domestic forces need to be satisfied before the next turn in the 
election cycle occurs. Endogenous economic theory applies this logic to nation-state policy formulation 
regarding the global economy. Individuals form coalitions depending on their role in the economy 
(Stopler and Samuelson 1941). Such roles are economic factors (Rogowski 1989), economic sectors 
(Gourevitch 1986), or sectors that have specific assets (Frieden 1991). Each group will make their 
economic cost-benefit calculations and support foreign economic policies on this basis.  
iii See Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981) for the evidence of this process in the case of post-war 
Germany. 
iv While Greece is neither Catholic nor Protestant, it will be grouped together with the former.  
v “The data utilized in this publication were originally collected by the 2004 European Election Study 
research group. This study has been made possible by various grants. Neither the original collectors of the 
data nor their sponsors bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations published here. The data 
are available from the homepage of the European Election Study (www.europeanelectionstudies.net  and 
from the Archive Department of GESIS (the former Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) 
at the University of Cologne – www.gesis.org), Germany.” 
vi The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual level analysis. While some researchers believe that 
aggregation of individual level responses to opinion surveys remove random “noise” from the 
measurements (Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), research shows that the 
error associated with individual level variation may be systemic (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000). 
Therefore aggregating the data would not remove any associated “noise,” but instead may harm the 
robustness of potential results due to a lower number of observations.  
vii Every attempt was made to include controls for alternative explanations. The survey did not ask 
questions associated with operationalizing postmaterialist values and cognitive mobilization (Inglehart 
1977b; 1990), so these variables were not included.  
viii McLaren (2002) and Carey (2003) used survey questions that directly measured nationalism. I use the 
left-right self-evaluations as a proxy given that the survey used in this paper does not have direct 
measures. 
